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SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS
Habeas Corpus-A Dilemma
Revisited
by John Oshinsky
Despite the trend toward limitation of habeas corpus
review,' the Supreme Court, in Rose v. Mitchell, 99 S. Ct.
2993 (1979), widens the scope of review by holding that
federal habeas corpus review may be used to redeter-
mine constitutional questions adjudicated in state court.
Rose began in November, 1972 in Tipton County, Ten-
nessee, where a grand jury indicted black defendants for
murder. Before trial, defendants filed a plea in abatement
seeking dismissal of the indictment. They contended that
blacks had been systematically excluded from serving as
grand jury foremen. Three former Tipton County grand
jury foremen testified at a March 18, 1973 evidentiary
hearing. At the conclusion of the inquiry, the judge de-
nied the plea in abatement. The Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee denied certiorari and the defendants then filed a
habeas corpus petition in the United States Federal Dis-
trict Court.
Dismissing the petition, the Federal District Court
found that the State had effectively refuted the defend-
ants' prima facie case of discrimination in the grand jury
foreman selection process. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the
State had failed to refute the respondants' claim of dis-
crimination in the selection process.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
On July 2, 1979, in a split decision, the court held that
defendants had failed to make a prima facie case of dis-
crimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause in selection of a grand jury fore-
man.
The Court affirmatively answered the question
whether claims of discrimination in the selection of the
grand jury foreman are cognizable on an application for a
writ of habeas corpus by a defendant judged guilty at
'In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), the adequate state
ground doctrine, that state courts that have decided not to consider
claims for a nonconstitutional reason, was held to be nonreviewable
on federal habeas corpus. This amounted to a rejection of Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1973) with regard to this point. In Swain v. Pressley,
430 U.S. 372 (1977), the Court, in a per curium decision, upheld the
power of Congress to remove habeas jurisdiction from federal courts,
replacing it with an adequate remedy to be used in the local District of
Columbia courts. Both of these cases stem from Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 405 (1979), which held first, that a forfeiture standard renews the
adequate state ground doctrine, and second, to prevent habeas relief
when the state has provided an adequate post-conviction procedure.
proceedings otherwise free of constitutional error. The
Court recognized that a negative response would be
viewed as a lack of fairness contrary to our system's prin-
ciples of justice. The Court reached this conclusion de-
spite its awareness of the costs associated with hearing a
case. 2
Justice Blackmun pointed out that the Supreme Court,
in a continuous line of cases extending back to Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), has held that "a
criminal conviction of a Negro cannot stand under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if
it is based on an indictment of a grand jury from which
Negroes were excluded by reason of their race ... Where
sufficient proof of discrimination in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment has been made out and not rebutted,
this Court uniformly has required that the conviction be
set aside and the indictment returned by the unconstitu-
tionally constituted grand jury be quashed." Rose, supra
at 2997-98. The Court in Rose, however, uses Strauder
to justify extending the writ of habeas corpus even
though Strauder involved a writ of error. 100 U.S. at 304.
A writ of error is in no way analagous to the writ of
habeas corpus. Habeas corpus seeks release of a pris-
oner while a writ of error seeks to set aside a judgment on
an alleged error of law. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1881).
Justice Blackmun noted that prior to Rose, only former
Supreme Court Justice Jackson had felt convictions
should not be set aside because of discrimination in the
grand jury selection process. In his dissenting opinion in
Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 293 (1950), Justice Jack-
son stated that discrimination in the grand jury selection
process is not connected with guilt or innocence because
the grand jury does not make a final determination of
guilt or innocence. While acknowledging the harm of dis-
crimination in the selection of grand juries, Justice Jack-
son concluded that "however great the wrong toward
qualified Negroes of the community," it was harmless to
the defendant. Id. at 304 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Although the issue as to the exclusion of blacks from
grand and petit juries was raised as far back as 1880, the
question of whether to review convictions on a writ of
habeas corpus because of these exclusions has not yet
been clearly resolved. As Justice Walter V. Schaefer of
the Illinois Supreme Court has pointed out, "The prob-
lem has remained an important and, to a degree, an
unresolved one." Schaefer, Federalism and State Crimi-
nal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1, 3 (1956) [hereinafter
Schaefer].
2 These costs include time, money and, most important, its effect upon
the federal structure. The grant of habeas corpus by federal courts saps
the justices' vitality and strains the already overtaxed budget, while
accomplishing nothing. Pollack, Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ, 66
YALE L.J. 50 (1956).
FORUM
In In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891), Wood, a black
man, was convicted of murder by a New York court.
Following his conviction, Wood argued that the grand
and petit juries before which he appeared excluded
blacks from jury service. Affirming dismissal of the writ of
habeas corpus. Justice Harlan stated that whether the
grand or petit jury was .discriminatorily selected "was a
question which the trial court was entirely competent to
decide and its determination could not be reviewed...
.upon a writ of habeas corpus, without making that writ
serve the purpose of writ of error." Id. at 286.
The position of Justices Jackson and Harlan received
support from other members of the Court in Rose. Jus-
tices Stewart, Rehnquist and Powell agreed that inten-
tional discrimination in the selection of the grand jury
foreman was not reason enough to cast aside an other-
wise error-free conviction. Additionally, Justice Powell
stated that issuance of the writ of habeas corpus in Rose
was unsupported by the writ's history and purpose. The
writ was intended to be limited to those instances in
which the trial court lacked jurisdiction to render a com-
petent judgment.
Justice Powell agreed with the petitioner's view that
habeas corpus review has been extended too far, becom-
ing, in fact, a continuation of the state appellate process.
Thus, in Rose, the alleged discrimination in selecting a
grand jury foreman did not create sufficient grounds for
granting habeas corpus review because the subsequent
trial was free from reversible constitutional error and
there had been a complete and impartial litigation in state
court. As Justice Powell mentioned, Rose cast aside the
traditional purpose of the writ by allowing federal district
courts to review state decisions "in criminal cases as the
rule, rather than the exception that it should be." ' 99
S.Ct. at 3013 (Powell, J., concurring).
As it had frequently done since Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443 (1953), the Supreme Court took for granted
that the function of federal habeas corpus review was to
redetermine the merits of federal issues previously liti-
gated in state court. Brown allowed all constitutional is-
sues to be reviewed under a writ of habeas corpus with-
out considering the competency of the state court's adju-
dication of the claim. Yet this writ should be used only
where the state court did not provide full and conscien-
tious adjudication of federal claims.4 The administration
of justice would be better served by returning to the pre-
3Justice Powell carefully pointed out that in such cases as Pierre v.
Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939). Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942),
and Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), "the question of
discrimination in selection of the grand jury was presented on direct
appeal, and there was no occasion to consider the proprity of federal
collateral attack." 99 S. Ct. at 3013 (Powell, J., concurring).
'Judge Henry J. Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, sees no reason to single out claims of a constitutional
Brown federal habeas review standard. This attitude was
largely reflected in the Court's opinions in In re Wood,
and in Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 (1951), which
served to reiterate Wood.
There are significant problems arising from the expan-
sion of federal habeas jurisdiction. While existence of ha-
beas corpus serves as an ever-present reminder that fed-
eral law is superior to state law, its expanded use has
intensified the rift between state and federal courts.'
The concept of federalism necessitates that conflicts
resulting from federal interference with the states' per-
formance in adjudicating claims be outside the federal
domain in the absence of need, where the urgency for
habeas relief is as uncertain as it was in Rose. According
to one commentator, the desire for finality and settle-
ment, legitimate goals of the criminal process, are under-
mined by the continuous reexamination of questions as a
way of insuring that no errors were committed. 6 It is gen-
erally acknowledged that it is inappropriate for a lone
federal district court judge to reexamine the correctness
of a state court conviction, especially where the convic-
tion has been affirmed by the state's highest court and
certiorari has been denied by the United States Supreme
Court. Schaefer, supra at 17-18. Consequently, it has
been suggested that the use of federal habeas corpus has
retarded the administration of state criminal sanctions. Id.
at 17.
While Brown v. Allen, supra, involved problems relat-
ing to federalism, it would be inappropriate to view these
problems as simply a source of friction between state and
federal judges when state judges' decisions are reversed.
Habeas review taxes the resources of the state judiciary,
the State's Attorney's Office as well as the Public
Defender's Office. The process of justice falters because
of the span of time between conviction in the trial court
and final habeas corpus relief, all attribut-
able to the indiscriminate review of cases taken up on
habeas. While we should not be restricted by the fact that
these resources are not available in unlimited supply, we
should be sensitive to this.
The Brown decision opened the gates to a myriad of
habeas petitions from state prisoners. Justice Jackson
spells out some of the resulting problems judges face
nature as grounds for collateral attack where these questions have
been completely addressed under equitable state proceedings. Ac-
cording to Judge Friendly. it makes "good sense" to deny prisoners
the use of collateral attack following proper adjudication of claims in
state court, for it would deter frivolous petitions. Friendly, Is Innocence
Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgements, 38 U. CHI. L.
REV. 142, 156-157 (1970) [Hereinafter Friendly].
Wright and Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The
Allocation of Fact Finding Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895, 899
(1966).
6 Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 4A1, 505 (1963) [Hereafter Bator].
Friendly, supra at 148.
when deluged by these petitions. The "frivolous and rep-
etitious petitions ... prejudice the occasional meritorious
application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He
who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end
up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the
search." 334 U.S. at 536-537.
One commentator is careful to point out that were the
Brown decision overturned, this would not guarantee
that petitions lacking merit would disappear.' But given
the physical limitations associated with our legal system, it
makes little economic sense and lacks reasoned institu-
tional justification to redetermine the merits of a particular
case. There is, or should be, according to the commenta-
tor, a presumption that if a job can be performed once it
need not be done twice.9
Another side of this problem surfaces as a result of
insufficient post-conviction remedies offered by many
states. Another commentator maintains that in such in-
stances, collateral attack is the only avenue available to
preserve a state prisoner's federal constitutional rights. " If
no collateral attack were made available, then there
would be no sufficient remedy should facts be unearthed
after conviction. Both Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28
(1957), where the prosecution concealed evidence favor-
able to the defendant, and Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103 (1935), where perjured testimony was introduced,
illustrate the commentator's assertion. He recognizes the
need for habeas relief when courts are derelict in their
duty to insure a fair hearing.11 However, he fails to
fathom the superfluousness connected with the extension
of the writ after state trial courts have thoroughly and
fairly adjudicated constitutional questions. Brown.
8 Bator, supra at 507.
9 Id. at 450.
10 Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Post Conviction Remedy for State
Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 461, 464 (1960).
"Id. at 524.
12 Of course, not all persons view relitigation as superfluous in nature.
Some suggest that redundancy, with respect to a relitigation of error
alleged by the defendant, increases the probability that constitutional
rights will be protected. Robert M. Cover and T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L. J.
1035 at 1045, (1978). Aleinikoffs and Cover's views are acknowl-
edged by Professor Pye, who feels that the expanded scope of ha-
beas review, has led to the "implementation of constitution rights
which have existed only in theory in the past." Pye; The Warren
Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REV. 249, 258 (1968).
This article does not presume to suggest that trial courts
should have the final say in all cases, nor does it recom-
mend the reduction of federal guarantees for state pris-
oners, which would surely make the administration of
justice on the state level less consistent and more prone to
mistake. It simply advocates the reduction of habeas ap-
peal of claims fully adjudicated in state courts. The bur-
den should be on the state courts to insure the safeguards
that had previously been guaranteed through habeas
corpus relief. This will serve the best interests of justice by
permitting the majority of state decisions, which are con-
scientiously and constitutionally made, to stand. Only
where states do not provide full and conscientious adjudi-
cation of federal claims and constitutional questions is it in
the interest of justice to grant habeas corpus review.
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